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Steele: Scandals Great and Small

SCANDALS GREAT AND SMALL
John Steele*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The conference theme-Lawyering at the Edge-evokes images of
lawyers ensnared in legal scandals, lawyers testing the boundaries of the
ethics rules, and lawyers at their moral and emotional limits. Lawyers at
the edge labor under psychological and social pressures. They are tested
and tempted. They are under pressure and under attack. The scandals
threaten to overwhelm them.
I will focus on two kinds of cases where lawyers face those
pressures. One kind involves lawyers caught up in controversies where
the tactics veer toward the vicious as opponents "fight fire with fire"cases we often describe as "spiraling," or "out of control," or having "a
life of their own." Lurking behind those phrases is the notion that
rationality no longer reigns.
The second kind involves those public controversies where large
numbers of the public use the dispute as a vehicle for vindicating private
prejudices and venting personal frustrations. There is a sense of a storm
swirling around the participants. The prosecution of the Duke lacrosse
players was like that, as were the murder trials of O.J. Simpson and
Scott Peterson. In those controversies, the public's emotional investment
relentlessly fueled the social pressures until the narrative reached its
climax-be it just or unjust.
But such legal disputes also produce a second compelling
narrative-the lawyers' personal stories as they struggle at the center of
the storm to maintain their moral footing. We have seen that narrative in
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films starring Jimmy Stewart and Tom Cruise.' We've also seen it in
real life, as when prosecutor Michael Nifong hurtled over the edge,2 and
when defense lawyer Major Daniel Mori remained morally grounded
even as he crept toward ethically ambiguous territory.3
To explore the world of lawyers practicing at the edge, I will use a
technical definition of scandal that is based upon the word's original
meaning of "trap" or "snare." I will provide a full derivation and
explanation later in this Article and then use it to interpret several recent
legal disputes. For now, it is enough to know the danger inherent in any
scandal is that the participants will become scandalized-will surrender
to psychological and social forces that may prove to be beyond their
control. In this Article, then, lawyering "at the edge" means lawyering at
the border of being scandalized.
II.

BEING SCANDALIZED, OR NOT

Let us start with two examples-one in which a capital defense
investigator succumbed to the scandal and another in which two polaropposite opponents refused to be drawn into a scandal with each other.
A. Kathleen Culhane4
In April 2007, Kathleen Culhane, a non-lawyer investigator doing
capital defense work for the Habeas Corpus Resource Center, pled guilty
to forging juror signatures on affidavits for the purpose of reversing
death sentences. 5 At one level, one wonders how Culhane thought she
could get away with clumsy forgeries in an adversarial system where
motivated opponents were scrutinizing each pleading. One also wonders
about the deeper psychology behind the act.
Although it is difficult to do armchair psychoanalysis using only
media accounts, we do have statements from Culhane, her lawyer, and

1. See ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures 1959) (depicting Jimmy Stewart as a
defense lawyer struggling to defend a questionable client accused of murder); A FEW GOOD MEN
(Castle Rock Entertainment 1992) (starring Tom Cruise as a Navy lawyer defending two Marines
accused of murdering a fellow Marine).
2. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
4. This section is based upon two news stories. See Mark Martin, 5-year Term for
Investigator in Forgery Case, S.F. CHRONICLE, May 1, 2007, at B1; Louis Sahagun, Death Penalty
Foe Gets Five Years in Prison;A Former Defense Investigator Faked Documents to Try to Delay
FourExecutions, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at B 1.

5. Sahagun, supra note 4.
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one of her supporters. Culhane had devoted her life to social justice. "In
high school, Culhane joined a group that assisted disadvantaged people
in Mexico." 6 Later, she joined the "frustrating legal world" of capital
defense, where she "worked as an investigator for prisoner rights
programs, sometimes tracking down relatives and witnesses in the slums
and hinterlands of Mexico, Central America, West Africa and Haiti. 7
Capital defense is as demanding a job as one can find in the American
legal system. The positions are under-funded. The legal tests are onesided. Cops sometimes lie, prosecutors sometimes cheat, and trial court
errors by the thousands are casually brushed aside and declared to be
"harmless." It's a world where defense lawyers who sleep during trial
are not considered ineffective. Courts are unmoved by statistics showing
the bias with which the death penalty is imposed. And proof of the errors
caused by false confessions, false witness identifications, and failures to
use DNA testing have failed to create a groundswell of support for death
penalty moratoriums. The process should be a scandal to the public, but
it mostly threatens to scandalize only overworked and sometimes vilified
capital defense workers. Culhane's working environment was one in
which the rare victories usually meant simply delaying the legal
machinery of death.8 Capital defense workers never quite achieve their
goal of awakening the public's outrage about the injustice of executions.
Culhane, who viewed the death penalty as the "brutal legacy of
lynching" 9 and who saw her capital defense work as part of her larger
social justice work, fought on nonetheless.
Culhane did post-conviction investigations for Michael Morales,
who had been condemned to death for the brutal murder and rape of
Terri Winchell in 1981. Years later, the trial court judge wrote a letter to
the governor on Morales's behalf, seeking the governor's clemency and
asserting the judge's belief that Morales was wrongly convicted.' 0 Here
at last was a case with a realistic chance of reversal. To bolster the
judge's letter, Culhane tracked down some of the jurors, but they offered
no support. So, "frustrated and desperate,"'" Culhane "spent a few allnighters"' 12 in a hotel forging juror affidavits.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

11.
12.

Id.
Id.
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Predictably, the crude scheme unraveled. Culhane is now serving
five years in jail. Even by her own account, Culhane's fraud didn't
"ma[ke] a ping in the legal system."' 13 She tarnished the reputation of the
lawyers she had worked with, slandered the honorable calling of capital
defense lawyers and, according to lawyers for both sides, "compounded
the suffering of [the] friends and family"' 14 of Morales and Winchell
alike. Although the self-destructive act was a total failure both morally
and practically, Culhane remains unrepentant. 5
B. Terry Stewart and Robert Tyler

16

Two attorneys were pitted against each other in two Californiabased litigations over same-sex marriage and workplace benefits for
domestic partners. One, Terry Stewart, who heads the Office of the City
Attorney of San Francisco's litigation unit, was a lesbian living with her
partner, Carole Scagnetti. They decided not to participate in San
Francisco's controversial same-sex marriage program until final victory
had been won-a decision that made the internationally visible litigation
a very personal matter for Stewart. (Stewart's litigation team at the City
Attorney's office included lawyers who had taken advantage of the
program and who were therefore fighting for the legitimacy of their
marriages.) Together, Stewart and Scagnetti had become legal guardians
of an African-American teen whose family situation had deteriorated.
Stewart describes herself as a Jack Russell terrier, meaning that once she
sees her goal, she's obsessive and tenacious, "digging and pushing and
working hard."' 7 To support her mayor's decision to issue same-sex
licenses despite a California voter initiative limiting marriage to manwoman unions, Stewart tirelessly dug up obscure precedents from the
1800s and from English common law.
The other attorney, Robert Tyler, is a married, suburban father of
four working for a Christian-based advocacy group, the Alliance
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. This section is based upon two sources: (1)my memory of a guest lecture appearance that
Terry Stewart made to my legal ethics class at UC Berkeley School of Law on March 17, 2005; and
(2) Susan Beck, Breaking the Marriage Barrier: After Leaving Am Law 200 Partnership to be
S.F. 's Top Litigator, Attorney Leads the Defense of its Same-Sex Wedding Policy, AM. LAW., June
1, 2004, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1085626353274. Rather than include a footnote to
the Susan Beck article for each sentence in this section, I will provide additional footnotes only for
direct quotations from that article.
17. Beck, supra note 16.
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Defense Fund. 18 Tyler, assisted by some big firm lawyers, had earlier
opposed Stewart in federal appellate court over whether San Francisco
could force employers to offer benefits to domestic partners.' 9 Now,
Tyler opposed Stewart in the same-sex marriage litigation.
If ever there was an asymmetrical pair of lawyers opposed in a
high-stakes, controversial case with personal implications, you'd think it
had to be Stewart and Tyler. But, to the amazement of some, the two
treated each other cordially, professionally, and even with personal
appreciation. When she made a guest appearance at my legal ethics
class, Stewart said that some of the attorneys aligned on her side of the
case would pointedly ask her why she was friendly to Tyler, to which
Stewart replied that he had always been courteous to her.

III.

SOME THEORY ABOUT SCANDALS

I am not exploring the concept of scandal simply to draw up lists of
good lawyers who avoid being "snared" and bad lawyers who do not.
Nor do I suggest that getting along with your adversary as well as
Stewart and Tyler did is the desideratum of lawyering. Rather, I wish to
explore the concept because it provides an early warning system for
recurring ethical dangers, a chance at diagnosis when lawyers are losing
control, and a plan for action when one finds oneself in the confusing
world of scandals.
A.

Sources

My experience comes from several sources. One is my legal
experience in litigating, counseling, providing expert opinions, and in
teaching professional responsibility courses. My litigation experience
has taught me the most about scandals, because the litigator is directly
engaged in the fight. By definition, civil litigators in an adversarial
posture face each other aggressively and symmetrically. The client
"turns to" 20 an attorney who then "turns against" 2 1 the adversary. Almost
any civil litigation or trial can go awry if participants and lawyers lose
control and reprisal is met with reprisal. These, as I will argue below, are
the classic signs of a small, private scandal. I have certainly been
involved in at least one matter like that. I have also helped lawyers
18. Id.
19. Id.
20.
21.

PAUL BRAND, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION 46 (1992).
See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 21 (10th ed. 1996).
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manage emotional disputes, both public and private. Additionally, some
of my understanding of lawyering scandals has come from reading,
teaching, and discussing lawyering disputes-including discussions
such
22
as those we had at the "Lawyering at the Edge" conference.
B.

Definition

The dictionary says that a scandal is any disgraceful or discreditable
event. 23 In modem usage, the word often describes celebrity news or
trivial events that attract attention but that would be perhaps best
ignored. Even when used to describe weightier controversies, the word
"scandal" retains a connotation of something overblown, of reactions
that are more emotional than rational.
But the word has complex meanings and deep theological roots,
reflecting its ability to capture a persistent feature of human social
psychology. Hebrew scriptures made literal and figurative use of the
words mokesh (meaning "snare") and mikhshol (meaning "obstacle" or
"stumbling block").24 Often the words referred to external dangers, such
as opponents, false gods, and evildoers. 25 But the authors' folk
psychology perceived an additional, internal danger: "It is not only, or
even primarily, however, our enemies who set snares to entrap us; it is
26
we ourselves. Our own desires ... suggest that the enemy is within.,
Repeatedly in the scriptures, a protagonist earnestly pursues a desired
object only to learn, too late, that the object was an obstacle.27
When the Hebrew texts were translated into Koine Greek as the
Septuagint, the translators rendered those Hebrew terms as skandalon, a
Greek term for "snare.' 28 Because the Septuagint was the source for
22. I've also heard from lawyers who have been embroiled in great public scandals. I have
interviewed or spoken with military lawyers who have defended Guantanamo detainees (Lt. Cmdr.
William C. Kuebler and Major Tom Fleener); a member of the O.J. Simpson "dream team" (Santa
Clara University law professor Gerald F. Uelmen); a trial lawyer (Wazhma Mojaddidi) who
defended a Muslim-American convicted of terrorism; a lawyer who defended the City of San
Francisco's issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples (Terry Stewart); a public defender
who represented sexually-violent predators (Andrea Flint); a former federal prosecutor who helped
convict the radical lawyer Lynne Stewart (Christopher J. Morvillo); and a criminal defense lawyer
who has participated in many famous, controversial homicide trials (J. Tony Serra).
23.

24.
(1994).
25.
26.
27.
28.

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 1042.
DAVID MCCRACKEN, THE SCANDAL OF THE GOSPELS: JESUS, STORY, AND OFFENSE 22

Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 23.
See id. at 25.
Id. at 193-94.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss2/15

6

Steele: Scandals Great and Small
2007]

SCANDALS GREAT AND SMALL

503

many New Testament quotations from Hebrew scripture, and because
the psychological notion of offense remained central to early Christian
thinking, the terms skandalon and skandalizo, made forty-nine
appearances in the New Testament.2 9 The term is usually translated in
English as "scandal" or "stumbling block," but is also rendered with
cognates of the words for falling, deserting, hindrance, causing sin, and
giving/taking offense. 30 The term retained the dual uses of internal and
external traps and denotes moral dangers to participants and spectators
alike.
As with any trap, there is a danger that a scandal will not be
recognized until it is too late. Scandalized participants typically and
earnestly believe they must pursue a particular course of action, unaware
that their self-destructive agenda is set by a larger social dynamic.
Spectators are drawn toward morally offensive events and then stumble
over the very moral errors they found offensive.
In Roman Catholic theology, a scandal is a sin of giving offense to
others, of leading them astray, of leading others to emulate your sins.31
Leaders can create scandal, in this sense, as captured in the adage that "a
fish rots from the top." Peer groups, too, can create scandal, as when
teenage friends hop over a fence to steal a farmer's pears 32 or when a
business organization's ethical climate fosters immorality. 33 Scandals do
not always arise from isolated acts of specific people; they can also arise
from laws, institutions, fashion, and opinions.34 And scandal can be
given by people acting morally with good intent. 35 But whatever its
origin, scandal creates occasions of sin 36 that lead us to act in ways we
ourselves would condemn.
Ren6 Girard further refined the concept of scandal. Focusing on the
sources of human desire as disclosed in literature and scripture, Girard

29. Id.
30. Id.at 194.
31. See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, para. 2284, available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a5.htm#1; 7 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA
THEOLOGICA Ila-liae, Question 43.
32. 2 ST. AUGUSTINE CONFESSIONS 76-79 (William Watts trans., William Heinemann Ltd.

1950)(1631).
33. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. V 2005).
34. CATECHISM
OF
THE
CATHOLIC
CHURCH,
http://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a5.htm#l.
35. See id.at para. 2284.
36. See id. at para. 2284-87.
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emphasized the mimetic nature of desire.37 That is, we value objects that
we believe others value; we desire what others desire. In that sense,
others provide the model for our desire but also stand as an obstacle to
our possession of the object.38 If we cannot successfully manage those
conflicting orientations toward the model/obstacle, we can increasingly
ignore the desired object and focus on the other, who then becomes a
scandal to us. "Etymologically," then, "the scandal is that which causes
one to stumble. In its developed meaning, the stumbling block is the
hindrance that one loves . . . ."39 When the scandalization is reciprocal,
the two adversaries become monstrous doubles of each other and the
danger of violence, real or figurative, dramatically increases. Neither
participant recognizes his own responsibility for the dynamic; both
participants project onto the other the full responsibility for the crisis.
Hence scandalization feeds on self-deception.
In daily life, there are countless ways to manage situations that
threaten such psychological entrapment. But for litigators, who can
neither capitulate nor walk away, the task is harder. Because our legal
system is adversarial, we require litigators to become something just
short of scandals for each other. The lawyers stand in for the clients and
then stand off against each other. They seek the same object-the
unanimous approval of the jury. The opposing lawyer serves as model
and obstacle.
We have codes of civil procedure, ethics rules, codes of
professionalism, and social norms to constrain our worst impulses. And
mimetic processes can inhibit scandal as well as exacerbate them.
Positive role models serve that function as well.4 °
When the mimetic process is successfully managed, we play out
our rivalries on the merits and under the rules. When it is managed
poorly, the constraints fail and the litigators turn into monstrous doubles
of each other, believing the worst about each other and mimicking each

37. ROBERT G. HAMERTON-KELLY, THE GOSPEL AND THE SACRED: POETICS OF VIOLENCE IN
MARK 129-30 (1994); see also John Steele, A Seal Pressed in the Hot Wax of Vengeance: A
GirardianUnderstandingof Expressive Punishment, 16 J. L. & RELIGION 35 (2001).
38.

REN'E GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED 143-49 (Patrick Gregory trans., Johns

Hopkins Univ. Press 1977) (1972).
39. ROBERT G. HAMERTON-KELLY, SACRED VIOLENCE: PAUL'S HERMENEuTC OF THE
CROSS 21 (1992).

40. Clive Stafford-Smith's presentation at the conference illustrated how an attorney can fight
hard on the merits but use humor to avoid being scandalized. See Clive Stafford-Smith, Founder &
Legal Dir. of Reprieve, Speech at the Hofstra Law School's 2007 Legal Ethics Conference:
Lawyering at the Edge (Oct. 14, 2007) (video on file with the Hofstra Law Review).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss2/15

8

Steele: Scandals Great and Small
20071

SCANDALS GREATAND SMALL

505

other's worst behaviors. Nietzsche might have been speaking about
litigators when he warned: "Whoever fights with monsters should see to
it that he does not become one himself.' 4 1 I call this pathology a "small
scandal." As we'll see below, when this small scandal occurs in criminal
or civil litigation, the lawyers begin
to "fight fire with fire," or focus on
42
lawyer.
opposing
the
out"
"taking
Girard also defines and analyzes great scandals that lead to episodes
of social scapegoating. Great scandals are fueled by small scandals-the
"dissensions, rivalries, jealousies, and quarrels 'A3 of everyday life which,
like a sort of social friction, are constantly building up and discharging.
Mostly, we find healthy ways to inhibit or discharge these negative
desires. And we usually find collective ways to accomplish the same
goals. But not always. Sometimes societies come under great stress. The
economy falters. There are military defeats. Or a contagious disease
races through the population. Under those conditions, social stresses
build. Sometimes societies are plagued by systemic inequalities that
generate friction. Sometimes we witness transgressive acts that shock
our moral sensibilities. When the latent social frictions build toward a
crisis point, they tend to coalesce around a suitable controversy.
As the social panic increases mimetically-through imitation of
others' panic-we may reach a crisis requiring decisive resolution.
When scandal and crisis develop without restraint, a lynch mob can form
and discharge its fury on a victim. (Indeed, as I'll discuss below, I was
once in a crowd that I felt was capable of mob justice.) After the fury is
spent, the mob perceives a sense of unity and dissipated tension." But
this is self-deception. The mob erroneously attributes the crisis to the
victim and interprets the resulting peace as being due to the victim's
great evil. 45 These two falsehoods are hallmark symptoms of moral
panic.

41.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 69 (Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Judith

Norman eds., Judith Norman trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (2001).
42. See David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on ProgressivePublic-Interest
Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209, 220-25 (2003) (focusing in particular on attacks on progressive
lawyers).
43. GIRARD, supra note 38, at 8.
44. See, e.g., HARRY FARRELL, SWIFT JUSTICE: MURDER AND VENGEANCE IN A CALIFORNIA
TOWN 228-42 (1992).
45.

See RENE GIRARD, THINGS HIDDEN SINCE THE FOUNDATION OF THE WORLD 51-53

(Stephen Bann & Michael Metteer trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1987) (1978); HAMERTON-KELLY,
supra note 39, at 25-26.
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Mob justice is rare. Typically, we mediate the crisis through our
social institutions, such as legislatures, electorates, and juries. But those
institutions are not immune from scandal. Quite the contrary. As
Gustave LeBon noted, legislatures, electorates, and juries can be
considered special purpose mobs.46 They channel scandals, for better or
worse. Legislatures can pass "moral panic" legislation.47 Electorates can
demand punitive laws. 48 Juries can convict in a moral panic, as happened
in the infamous child abuse convictions in the 1980-90s 49 and as may be
happening to some accused terrorists today.5 ° In that sense, Kathleen
Culhane was correct-a death qualified jury is a successor-in-function to
a lynch mob.5 1
Our adversarial system invokes scandals in a controlled way. Civil
litigations resemble small scandals because the parties are symmetrically
situated. The preponderance standard is practically neutral. The parties
are formally on an equal footing. We do not say, "it is better that ten
injured plaintiffs go uncompensated than a single defendant unfairly pay
a judgment."
In contrast, a criminal trial resembles a great scandal, a mimetic
crisis, or a mob process. Typically, "the people," embodied by the
prosecutor, stage a verbal reenactment of the crime and then a
unanimous citizenry (the jury) inflicts good violence (punishment) on
the accused.
Our legal ethics rules reflect these two different approaches. The
ethics rules don't formally differentiate between civil litigators for
plaintiffs and defendants; the lawyers are symmetrically situated. On the
criminal side, however, we find differentiated ethics.52 The ethics rules

46.

GUSTAVE LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND 166-207 (1960).

47. The term "moral panic" is often attributed to Stanley Cohen. See, e.g., STANLEY COHEN,
FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS AND ROCKERS (1972). I first

encountered the term in the writings of Professor Michael Tonry. In my view, Girard gives the most
satisfying explanation of the phenomenon, although he uses different terminology.
48. See Susan A. Bandes, The Heart Has Its Reasons: Examining the Strange Persistence of
the American DeathPenalty, 42 STUD. L., POL. & SOC'Y 21 (2007).
49. See generally DOROTHY RABINOWiTZ, No CRUELER TYRANNIES: ACCUSATION, FALSE
WITNESS, AND OTHER TERRORS OF OUR TIMES (2003) (describing her coverage of the rash of

accusations of child abuse by preschool workers).
50. See id.; Dorothy Rabinowitz, From the Mouths of Babes to a Jail Cell: ChildAbuse and
the Abuse of Justice, HARPER'S MAG., May 1990, at 52 (concerning the infamous accusation and
prosecution of Kelly Michaels for alleged sexual assault).
51. Sahagun, supra note 4.
52. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2007) (criminal defense lawyers given
unique treatment); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007) (criminal prosecutor has
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governing the prosecutor, who stands with "the people," aim to restrain
the power of the accusatory mob. The ethics rules governing the defense
lawyer, who stands with the accused in the middle of the mob, aim to
amplify the power of the accused to defend himself.
These definitions of scandal are successful only if useful. So I will
now turn to some examples of "small scandals" and "great scandals."
IV. SMALL SCANDALS

So if opposing lawyers are required to play the role of scandal for
each other, how should they function with each other? It seems that
many lawyers just "get it." Perhaps the oddest such pair is not Terry
Stewart and Robert Tyler, but rather Andrew McCarthy, the prosecutor
of Omar Abdel Rahman (the "Blind Sheikh"), and Lynne Stewart, who
defended Rahman and was subsequently convicted for assisting Rahman
to send forbidden messages from prison.53 In an article titled Lynne
Stewart & Me, 54 McCarthy tries to reconcile his genuine fondness for
Lynne Stewart with their professional, political, and ideological
differences. McCarthy found that, for the most part, Stewart was
reasonable, practical, open-minded, and true to her word. 55
It doesn't always work like that. Some lawyers skillfully "bait"
their opposition into becoming scandalized, while themselves avoiding
any obvious improprieties. Every county courthouse has at least one
lawyer who "everyone knows" is a lying jerk, yet who somehow never
gets sanctioned or disciplined. Such lawyers love to be hated, and the
strategy can sometimes throw the opposition lawyers off their game.
And sometimes lawyers just attack the other side. As L. Ali Khan
notes: "Parties, including governments, often refuse to distinguish
between their opponents and lawyers who represent them. 56 So, for
example, prosecutors and defense lawyers sometimes mirror each
other's real or imagined excesses in the game of tit-for-tat. Gerald
Uelman described this phenomenon in his reflections on the ethics of
special duties). Compare ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Ch. 3 ("The Prosecution
Function"), with Ch. 4 ("The Defense Function") (Supp. 1986).
53. United States v. Sattar, 395 F. Supp. 2d 79, 84-88, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (affirming
conviction of lawyer Lynne Stewart).
54. Andrew C. McCarthy, Lynne Stewart & Me, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 15, 2005,
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=OGFkNjA4YTJkY2ZhN2YyY2U50GMwZTY IOGU2NTk4
MTI=.
55. Id.
56. L. Ali Khan, Advocacy Under Islam and Common Law, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstmct=1016381.
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Clarence Darrow. Focusing on the criminal trial of Darrow himself for
bribing jurors and planting spies in the prosecutor's office, Uelman
captured this notion of "fighting fire with fire":
This immediately identifies a serious problem with "fighting fire with
fire." Over an extended period of time, everyone forgets who set the
first fire. The Los Angeles prosecutors probably justified their use of
spies and informants in the defense camp because they were sure
Darrow would deploy spies and informants against them. From this
perspective, they were the ones fighting fire with fire. Thus, fighting
fire with fire invites a constantly escalating conflagration with
diminishing ability to sift through the ashes and determine who started
it.57

This small-scale scandalization is a perennial threat, but today is
particularly acute. The federal government "took out" the opposing
lawyers in the KPMG case and tried to take out the big law firms
representing Guantanamo detainees.5 8 The problem arises in private
litigation as well: "If a lawyer is vigorously advocating his client's
cause, the lawyer is not only identified with the client but may be seen as
an aider and abettor." 59 Currently the law of lawyer liability is
witnessing repeated attempts to expand lawyers' liability for aiding and
abetting their clients' torts.6 ° Similarly, we have seen frequent use of
tactical disqualification motions. One might think that refusing to
expand lawyer liability would only serve the economic self-interest of
lawyers, but there is a larger issue at stake: To what extent will we
indulge the logic of scandal and permit the legal process to turn on
itself?
Here's another example of small scandals, but this time outside of
litigation. One frequently sees a small scandal when a partner departs a
firm. The original firm, realizing that one of its partners is "in play,"
might rush in and fight to retain the partner. The competing firms view
each other as models in the Girardian sense, in that each firm's desire for
the potential lateral stokes the other firm's desire. 6 1 But the model is also
57. Gerald F. Uelmen, Fighting Fire. with Fire: A Reflection on the Ethics of Clarence
FORDHAM L. REv. 1543, 1563 (2003).
58. Stephen Gillers, The "Charles Stimson" Rule and Three Other Proposals to Protect
Lawyers from Lawyers, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 323 (2007).
59. Khan, supra note 56, at 22.
60. See generally Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Let's Sue All the Lawyers: The Rise of Claims
Against Lawyers for Aiding and Abetting a Client's Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=I1017042 (examining this growing trend).
61. See GIRARD, supra note 38, at 144-48.

Darrow, 71
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an obstacle, because only one can possess the coveted object. As the two
firms begin to match each other's offers, tensions rise, and they interpret
the other's moves as bad faith and "over the line." A game of reciprocal
"hard ball" ensues. The firms face each other in a symmetrical posture of
distrust and aggression.
If the departing partner keeps the lateral move secret until it is
announced, or if the new firm wins the bidding war, a different "small
scandal" ensues, with both firms fighting over the clients. Of course, no
firm owns its clientele. But the logic of scandal can be irresistible. In the
scramble for clients, each firm interprets the other's conduct in the most
negative way and then imitates it in a game of "tit for tat." The result is a
race to the bottom, a co-dependent process, in which participants share
responsibility for each other's conduct. I have seen participants remain
indignant decades after a break-up. I have also seen emotional
reconciliations in which participants forgive each other and wonder what
had caused them to act as they did.
A few years back, one of those small scandals ballooned into a
public spectacle. Frode Jensen, a partner at Pillsbury Winthrop,
announced internally that he was moving to Latham & Watkins.62
According to news accounts and Jensen's subsequent allegations,
tensions within Pillsbury were high because they had previously lost
partners to Latham and other firms. Not surprisingly, Jensen sought a
smooth exit. He negotiated with Pillsbury over the text of a press release
by Latham and thought that agreement had been reached. But after
Latham made its announcement, "Pillsbury stunned the legal community
when Chair Mary Cranston and Managing Partner Marina Park issued a
press release disparaging Jensen" as unproductive and worse.6 3 Jensen
quickly sued for forty-five million dollars 64 and the case settled quietly.
In the legal community, the question of the day was, "What were
they thinking?" When a firm believes that a departing partner had
become unproductive, self-interest normally leads the firm to publicly
state, "We wish the departing partner well," and then privately celebrate
62.

See Alexei Oreskovic, Pillsbury Pounds Ex-Partner as He Moves to Latham, THE

RECORDER, Sept. 6, 2002, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1030821171414; see
also Anthony Lin, FrodeJensen Finds a New Home at Holland & Knight, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14, 2004,

at 1.
63. Alexei Oreskovic, Pillsbury Settles With Frode Jensen, THE RECORDER, Apr. 2, 2003,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 048518230488.

64. Amended Complaint at 23, Jensen v. Pillsbury Winthrop LLP, No. CV-02-0191966-S
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2002), available at http://www.americanlawyer.com/pdfl101402jensencomplaint.pdf.
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that the firm's profitability has risen. But the sway of scandal is strong
and the sense of rivalry with Latham and other firms could have
overwhelmed common sense, particularly if there was an anxious mood
within the Pillsbury firm. So, when we view the process through the lens
of the "small scandal," we aren't surprised by the reaction and the
pertinent question becomes, "How did they succumb to the selfdefeating logic of scandal?"
Given the destructive nature of scandal, law firms utilize
prohibitions, norms, and ritual to prevent scandals from arising or
escalating. Take, for example, the scandal of compensation, a topic that
can rend firms apart. Many firms traditionally employed "closed
compensation" systems, in which partners did not know what other
partners made. The knowledge of what the other partners made was a
scandal to be kept out of sight and out of mind. Or they used "lockstep"
compensation, which eliminated incentives to play tit-for-tat. Today,
many firms believe that the best way to prevent internal warfare from
erupting is to utilize an open compensation system based on transparent
formulas, precisely defined partnership levels, and point systems. But
whatever system is used, the object is to prevent scandals from starting
and to contain the scandals that do.
It's harder for two firms to manage an incipient scandal between
themselves. In that context, community norms and ethics rules can help.
Let's return to the example of the departing partner and the resulting
scramble for clients. Ethics opinions have promulgated the helpful norm
that the departing partner and the original firm should jointly sign a
letter to the affected clients, explaining that the client chooses its lawyers
and asking for a written statement of the client's decision. Notice that
even under the "double signature" scenario, the original firm and the
new firm adopt a symmetrical posture-but this time they face the client
(not each other) in a posture of restraint and obedience.
V.

GREAT SCANDALS

When analyzing great scandals, we might ask where they come
from, how to identify them, and what we should do once we are in one.
A. Where They Come From
Sometimes it's clear why the scandal generated. The prosecution of
the Duke University lacrosse players was that way. Within various
communities on and around campus, deep reservoirs of discontent had

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss2/15

14

Steele: Scandals Great and Small
2007)

SCANDALS GREATAND SMALL

been generated by race issues, gender issues, class issues, antipathy
between geeks and jocks (that is, professors and athletes), friction
between "town and gown," and left-right culture wars. Then came
accusations that privileged white college athletes gang-raped a poor
African-American single mother after paying her to dance naked while
they chugged beer. A "perfect storm" quickly swirled, regardless of the
truth.65
Some great scandals are more puzzling. For example, for several
months in 2004, the public and popular media were obsessed with the
Northern California trial of Scott Peterson for murdering his pregnant
wife, Laci, on Christmas Eve, 2002.66 Why the public fascination with
that particular murder? It is hard to predict in advance which homicides
will engage the public imagination, but that trial certainly had some
classic elements: a fresh-faced, white, suburban, pregnant wife; a
Christmas Eve crime; bizarre behavior by the attractive, white, suburban
husband (at the time of his arrest in a golf course parking lot he had dyed
his hair and assembled a get-away kit that included sleeping pills and
Viagra).67 That is a potent recipe. Still, there was a fickleness, an
element of randomness, about why that particular murder drew so much
attention. The Scott Peterson trial probably had no lasting effect on the
public at large.
And sometimes great scandals are generated not by false
accusations or random processes, but by issues that merit our greatest
attention. In that category we must place the issue of morality and the
rule of law in the Global War on Terrorism. Even though some of the
issues in that controversy are substitutes for other social frictions, the
core of that dispute is real and will remain the pre-eminent event in
American legal ethics for this generation and longer.
B. How We Can Spot Them
One might think, "I know a scandal when I see one." That's often
true. But remember that great scandals involve some level of self65. STUART TAYLOR, JR. & K.C. JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL
CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE 16-32 (2007).
66. Carolyn Marshall, Jury Finds Scott Peterson Guilty of Wife's Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 2004, at A10.
67. Laci Peterson Case: What the Jury Didn't Hear, CNN.COM, Dec. 31, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/12/12/court.archive.petersonl0 (originally published in 2004
from CourtTVNews.com); Transcript of Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, CNN.COM, July 14, 2004,
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0407/14/acd.00.html; see also Marshall, supranote 66.
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deception. Large numbers of people-including, perhaps, ourselvesuse the scandal as a vehicle for resolving frustrations we formed
elsewhere. To justify anger and violence, a crowd deceives itself into
thinking that the accused threatens us with social chaos; we believe that
the calm we feel after the violence is due to the great wickedness of the
accused. I saw this very dynamic myself a few years ago.
My office in Redwood City, located about a block from the
courthouse, had scheduled a fire drill at almost precisely the time the
verdict was due in the Scott Peterson trial. Several of us walked down to
see what would happen. Helicopters hovered far above the courthouse,
filming the circus below. Reporters worked the crowd, hunting for
quotes. The news media "A-teams" set up canvas tents. Some in the
crowd brought hand-held radios to hear the verdict read over the air. The
crowd was tightly packed and it seemed to me that their emotions were
also tightly packed. A giddy, euphoric mood was weighted with anxiety
and tension.
I asked several people why they had come. For the history of it all,
replied some. This is the biggest thing ever to happen in Redwood City,
I was told by a man carrying his child high on his shoulders. Others had
more pointed agendas. One woman said that her brother-in-law had
gotten away with beating her sister, and that Scott should not get away
with it too. A man said that O.J. Simpson had gotten away with murder
and we shouldn't let Peterson get away with it too. Another man, visibly
upset, said that society was "going to hell" and "it's about time we did
something" about it.
I asked them why their personal concerns were relevant to
Peterson's guilt. Each one immediately conceded the irrelevance of their
comments to the issue of guilt, yet each quickly reiterated their personal
concerns with undiminished passion. Then someone yelled that the jury
was returning its verdict. "Quiet!" someone yelled. The huge crowd fell
perfectly silent and still. A long pause. "Guilty!" someone yelled. The
crowd erupted. People cheered, convulsed, and threw their hands in the
air. Strangers hugged strangers. The crowd was "as one." A few minutes
later, the crowd hissed when someone from the defense team walked out
the front door. I felt that the crowd was capable of administering justice
itself.
The indicia of a great scandal (or mimetic crisis), then, are large
numbers of people venting on collateral issues; charged, hyperbolic
accusations; allegations of potential social chaos and disintegration; and,
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of course, an accused standing literally or metaphorically in the middle
of the accusers.
C. How Lawyers Behave in Great Scandals
First, sometimes lawyers start great scandals or fan the flames-a
practice I will address below in my discussion of Michael Nifong.
Second, some lawyers seem drawn to scandals. If we find ourselves
drawn to scandals, we might analyze our motivations. Some lawyers
seem to be present so often when scandals appear-Alan Dershowitz,
Gloria Allred, and Mark Geragos come to mind-that one might wonder
why that is so. If being in the spotlight ever took precedence over
serving the client, there's a clear conflict of interest.
Third, lawyers are sometimes overwhelmed by the scandal and lose
sight of their role in the process. We repeatedly see decent people get
disoriented in a scandal. In my view, that is the best way to characterize,
for example, Judge Lance Ito, who while presiding over the O.J.
Simpson trial entertained celebrities in his chambers and generally
presided over a circus atmosphere.6 8 Likewise, William H. Ginsburg, a
respected medical malpractice lawyer better known as Monica
Lewinsky's first criminal defense lawyer, was "unaccustomed to the
burdens of great celebrity" and ran from media outlet to media outlet
making confusing pronouncements until Lewinsky replaced Ginsburg
with two respected members of the criminal defense bar.69 (Appearing
on all five major Sunday political talk shows is sometimes called a "Full
Ginsburg."7 ) Former prosecutor Michael Cardoza was a television news
analyst for the coverage of the Scott Peterson trial, yet for some reason
decided to moonlight as a consultant for the Peterson defense teamresulting in his ouster from the media analyst role.7'
In contrast to the lawyer who struggles and then loses her way in a
great scandal, we might consider Paul Biegler, the criminal defense

68. Howard Chua-Eoan & Elizabeth Gleick, Making the Case, TIME, Oct. 16, 1995, at 48, 55;
see also Frank Rich, Op-Ed., Judge Ito's All-Star Vaudeville, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1994, at 17.
69. Lloyd Grove, Bye Bye, Bill: The Lawyer Exits the Limelight, WASH. POST, June 3, 1998,
at DI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/
ginsburg06O398.htm; see also Ginsburg Departs as Lewinsky's Attorney, CNN.COM, June 2, 1998,
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/06/02/ginsburg.out/.
70. See Hendrik Hertzberg, Brouhahaha,NEW YORKER, Oct. 15, 2007, at 33.
71. Stacy Finz & Diana Walsh, Peterson Practices Being Cross-Examined, SFGATE.COM,
Oct.
18,
2004,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/archive/2004/10/18/
PETERSON 18.TMP.
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lawyer portrayed by Jimmy Stewart in Anatomy of a Murder.72 It's about
a murder case in which truth is elusive to the very end, lawyers for both
sides try to mold testimony to suit their needs, witnesses have their own
agendas, and the judge and jurors operate under prejudicial sexual
stereotypes. Biegler walks up the ethical line and perhaps on occasion
steps over it, but for the most part maintains his footing by sticking to
the traditional roles and wiles of the trial lawyer. By the end of the film,
Biegler has avoided calamity but appears no closer to the truth than
when he started. Biegler struggled and stumbled, but suffered no greater
disaster than having his client walk out on the fee.
Fourth, we see that some lawyers have the skill and the
temperament to stand by the accused in the middle of that circle. It's one
of the most traditionally honored aspects of the profession. For centuries
now, the lawyer's oath has called upon us to represent the friendless and
oppressed. 73 I'll return to this point below when I discuss particular
cases handled by Michael Tigar, J. Tony Serra, and Daniel Moi. Each of
them served as defense counsel but has adopted different orientations
toward the great scandal they faced.

VI. POSSIBLE ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS SCANDAL: A COMPARISON OF
PARTICULAR MATTERS HANDLED BY MICHAEL NIFONG, DANIEL MORI,
MICHAEL TIGAR, AND TONY SERRA

A.

Michael Nifong: The ProsecutorMagnifies the Scandal

In theory, the prosecutor will stand in for the people and move a
pre-existing social dispute into the courtroom where it will be resolved
under the rules of the game. The scandal is not eliminated; it is
constrained, harnessed, and tempered. The scandal is played out in a
theater of violence-the courthouse-rather than played out on the
streets.74

72.
73.

ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures 1959).
See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(h) (West 2003); ABA CANON OF ETHICS,

OATH OF ADMISSION § III (1908).
74.

AESCHYLUS, ORESTEIA 103-04 (Christopher Collard trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
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The prosecutor always threatens to subvert that function through
false accusations or fanning the flames 75 of the scandal. Hence the ethics
rules single out the prosecutor for special constraints.
During the 1980-90s, we witnessed an enormous mimetic crisis as
it surged through the American justice system. 76 Dozens of people were
convicted of child molestation for which there was no credible evidence.
Rather than being a brake on the crisis, prosecutors abetted it.
Prosecutors filed absurd charges alleging 77obviously impossible acts, and
then the cases "prosecute[d] themselves.
More recently, we witnessed the criminal prosecution of the Duke
lacrosse players. I mean "criminal prosecution" in two senses-the
normal one and also the sense that the prosecution was itself a criminal
act. Michael Nifong was held in criminal contempt for lying to the judge
about evidence.78 If the testimony of the DNA expert is to be believed
(and I do believe it),7 9 Nifong also engaged in criminal obstruction of
justice when he reached out to alter the expert's exculpatory report.
The North Carolina State Bar's initial discipline charges against
Nifong dealt with his numerous out-of-court statements demonizing the
defendants and witnesses. 80 It has been plausibly argued that Nifong,
who at the time was losing the electoral race to keep his job as District
Attorney, was motivated to further incite an already-upset electorate
against the defendants. 81 As it turned out, Nifong's dogged pursuit of the
defendants was the issue that won Nifong the election. 82 But, as a
"minister of justice ' 83 who is forbidden from "heightening public
condemnation of the accused,' ' 84 Nifong was perverting his role.

75. Crowds are often metaphorically described as naturally occurring, positive-feedback
events such as fires, storms, turbulent seas, overflowing rivers, and the like. See, e.g., ELIAS
CANET-II, CROWDS AND POWER 75-90 (Carol Stewart trans., Seabury Press 1978) (1960).
76. See RAB1NOWITZ, supra note 49, at 24-26.
77.
78.

30, 2007,
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

MARK BAKER, D.A.: PROSECUTORS IN THEIR OWN WORDS 28 (1999).
Nifong Pleads Not Guilty to Contempt Charge in Lacrosse Case, FOXNEWS.COM, Aug.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,295209,00.html.
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 65, at 311.
Id. at 321.
This theme runs throughout UntilProven Innocent. See generally id
See id at 295-98.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2007).

84. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007).
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B. Michael Tigar: The Defense Lawyer Seeks to Defuse the Scandal
The defense lawyer's response to the great scandal can vary. One
classic orientation is to defuse the scandal by defending, excusing,
mitigating, and contextualizing the defendant. The defense lawyer tries
to break down the mob psychology by humanizing the defendant. The
lawyer asks the jury members to step out of the mob and react as
individuals.
A good recent example is Michael Tigar's defense of Lynne
Stewart. For a variety of reasons, the defense wasn't able to attack the
Special Administrative Measures ("SAMs") that Stewart had violated
when she smuggled letters into and out of prison on behalf of her client
Omar Abdel Rahman.85 So, Tigar needed to create a context for jurors to
view Stewart sympathetically. He developed the rhetorical concept of a
"bubble" to create doubt as to whether Stewart had acted with the
requisite criminal intent. Tigar argued that because lawyers are required
to zealously serve their clients, when Stewart was faced with SAMs that
might have impinged on her lawyering, Stewart interpreted the SAMs
narrowly, in good faith, to create a "bubble" in which she could carry
out her lawyerly duties.86 Tigar himself suggested that Stewart's
interpretation was "mistaken,, 87 but in good faith. Thus he himself
modeled the stance he hoped jurors would imitate-understanding
Stewart in a way that did not permit a criminal conviction.
The role of standing by an accused who is surrounded by the mob is
a constitutional imperative but is also a moral imperative within the
Judeo-Christian ethos. Talmudic interpretation of the law served to
prevent mob action and to find something worth saving in the accused.88
The New Testament went so far as to call the Holy Spirit the
"paraclete"-the Greek term for defense counsel.8 9 In the Pericope of the
Adulteress, Jesus used subtle psychological techniques to induce
members of the mob to step out of that role, however briefly, and react
85. United States v. Sattar, 395 F. Supp. 2d 79, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
86. Transcript of Record at 11967-76, United States v. Sattar, 395 F. Supp. 2d 79 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (No. SI 02 Cr. 395), availableat http://www.lynnestewart.org/transcripts.01 1005.txt.
87. Id. at 11976.
88. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SHOUTING FIRE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN A TURBULENT AGE 329
(2002) (describing the high standards set by Jewish religious courts for imposing the death penalty);
RENE GIRARD, I SEE SATAN FALL LIKE LIGHTNING 118 (James G. Williams trans., Orbis Books
2001) (1999); Rabbi Dan Polish, Capital Punishment on Trial: Does Judaism Condone Capital
Punishment?,
REFORM
JUDAISM,
Summer
2002,
available
at

http://www.refornjudaismmag.net/02summer/focus.shtml.
89.

GIRARD, supra note 88, at 189-90.
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as individual human beings. 90 Inducing that reaction is still a matter of
life and death in American court rooms, as was recently explained by a
capital defense lawyer:
[T]here is built into a [death] penalty phase a basic dynamic of
empathy. That is, if the defense is doing it right. Let me be clearer. For
a defense attorney to succeed in a penalty phase, for a defense attorney
to convince a jury that this person doesn't have to be executed but they
can simply be put away for the rest of their life without parole,
typically to bring about that result means that just for a nanosecond
that the jury looks at the person and says "there but for the grace of
God go I," that there's something in them that [the jurors] can identify
with.
C. J. Tony Serra: The Defense Lawyer Creates Counter-ScandalInside
the Courtroom
Another defense strategy is to create a scandal and crisis in the
courtroom, but turn it back against the prosecution. That is the strategy
that criminal defense lawyer J. Tony Serra told me he uses in every
defense. 92 Serra says that a criminal trial deals with the "pre-cognitive
soft tissue" of the human brain, and therefore the defense attorney must
elicit emotions, must tie those emotions to moral issues, must be
outraged, must be self-righteous, and must use all the poetics at his or
her disposal to stake out a moral high ground. 93
Take, for example, Serra's defense in the retrial of Patrick "Hooty"
Croy, a Native American who had been sentenced to death for killing a
police officer in 1978. 94 Serra says that in the first trial, efforts to defend
and contextualize Croy had reinforced the pernicious stereotype of the
"drunk Indian." On retrial, Serra went on the offensive, raising the
"cultural defense" that police had violated a truce-had violated a sacred
trust.95 It was the police who stood accused; Croy was acquitted. Serra's

90. John 7:53-8:11.
91. Kevin M. Doyle & Charles J. Hynes, Catholics and the Death Penalty Panel Discussion,
44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 297, 317-18 (2005).

92. Telephone Interview with J. Tony Serra (June 29, 2007).
93. Id.
94. Id.; see also Wayne Wilson, Miscues on Probation Lead to Life Sentence for Croy,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 28, 1997, at B 1.

95. Telephone Interview with J. Tony Serra (June 29, 2007); see also Ann W. O'Neill,
Olson's Latest Lawyer No Stranger to Fame, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2000 (describing Serra's defense
of Croy).
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approach can be highly controversial. Even defense lawyers sometimes
attack him. 96 But my point here is not to argue the effectiveness of his
strategy, but rather to distinguish different orientations defense lawyers
can take toward the mob.
There is nothing novel about creating counter-scandal when the
police have overstepped their role. In those cases, defense counsel "turn
the tables" on the police and government, and such "turnabout is fair
play." We might further distinguish a category of cases where the
counter-scandal is consciously manufactured. In Defending Mohammad,
Robert Precht, a criminal defense lawyer, relates the story of the
criminal trial following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.97 Precht
tells an anecdote about the famed criminal defense lawyer William
Kunstler, who was preparing to defend a related criminal matter and who
wanted Precht to subpoena and cross-examine a government witness
who posed a threat to Kunstler's client. Kunstler would, in effect, get
free discovery on the witness who was implicating his client in the other
98
matter. So, Kunstler urged Precht to "create an incredible sideshow."
Precht declined. Kunstler pressed on: "Crimes are committed in the
name of justice by prosecutors and judges all the time. You should argue
that the FBI was behind the bombing and that it was a plot to discredit
enemies of U.S. policy in the Middle East." 99 Precht once again declined
the suggestion. Kunstler then let the matter drop and casually showed
Precht framed photographs of Kunstler with celebrities.'0 0
We might further distinguish the cases in which the defense lawyer
creates counter-scandal by pointing the finger not at the government but
at an innocent person. Although the purpose of this Article is primarily
descriptive, that strategy seems to stand on a different normative footing
than the "blame the government" cases. 10'

96. See, e.g., William Finnegan, Defending the Unabomber,NEW YORKER, Mar. 16, 1998, at
52.
97.
98.

ROBERT E. PRECHT, DEFENDING MOHAMMAD: JUSTICE ON TRIAL (2003).
Id. at 111-13.

99. Id. at 113.
100. Id. at 113-14.
101. See generally Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?: The Law
and Ethics of Shifting Blame in Criminal Cases, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1643 (2000) (analyzing the
ethics and morality of blame-shifting by criminal defense lawyers).
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D. Major Daniel Mori: The Defense Lawyer CreatesCounter-Scandal
Outside the Courtroom
A third defense strategy is the one adopted by Major Michael
"Dan" Mori in his representation of David Hicks, an Australian detained
by the United States military in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.102 Mori's
10 3
strategy was "to arouse political indignation" outside the courtroom.
That strategy subverts the classical notion that we remove the social
dispute from the public square and cabin it within the tribunal. °4 To
prevent the dispute from spilling back out into society at large, the ethics
rules and judicial gag orders forbid lawyers from trying their cases in the
press and from discrediting the tribunal itself.10 5 It's not surprising,
then,
06
that Mori's opponents accused him of unethical conduct.1
Those accusations were ultimately meritless. First, Moi had
technical defenses under the ethics rules. Second, Guantanamo is not
like other courts. Guantanamo is a new tribunal, which has already had
three different charters in its short life. 10 7 Its very existence and
legitimacy are hotly contested both domestically and abroad. Therefore,
Mori's decision to question the legitimacy of the court should not be
seen as breaching the cultural norm that criminal litigation is to take
place within the established courtroom. But, again, my purpose here is to
illustrate the different orientations defense counsel can take toward the
mob.

102. Posting of David Luban, The Vindication of Major Mori, to Balkinization,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/04/vindication-of-major-mori.html (Apr. 1, 2007, 12:02PM).
103. Id. News reports suggest that Mori's strategy has been followed by other military lawyers
in defense of other detainees. See Kirk Makin, Canadian Bar Association Moves to Support Rights
of Khadr, GLOBEANDMAIL.COM, Aug. 11, 2007, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/
RTGAM.20070811 .wmakin208I l/BNStory/National/home;
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CONCLUSION

Scandals are commonly compared to dangerous natural events,
such as fires, storms and winds, that are fueled by short-term, positivefeedback mechanisms. In giving advice about being trapped in a
scandal-about being scandalized-I will repeat here the warnings that
my mother gave me about the dangers of swimming in the ocean when
riptides are common. People standing safely on shore easily see a
riptide. But when you are in the surf, you can rarely see it; you can only
feel it. Even though you feel it, you probably cannot fight it. You must
swim sideways to escape it, and then you are back in control.
Advocates can't swim sideways. We are duty bound to stand by the
client and ride out the tides, storms, and fires. So, I end this Article
where I began it-hoping that the lawyer at the edge maintains her moral
footing, but also realizing that "scandal must come."10° 8 And when
scandal comes, lawyers will need knowledge of how scandals work, the
ability to recognize our orientation toward the scandal, the selfawareness to diagnose our own motivations, the help of friends outside
the scandal to guide us, and the courage to stand our ground.

108.

See Matthew 18:7.
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